At a meeting of Product Line Managers in Berlin in November 1981, I learned, in a casual conversation with Keijiro Sato, president of ITT Japan, the possibility of entering the Japanese market, because the Japanese authorities were eager to import European and American products in order to destroy the bad image of Japan in foreign markets, as a country that exports but hinders imports.
A mi vuelta hablé con el Director General de CITESA (Manuel Vidal) y decidimos intentarlo. Para conseguir más información enviamos al Ingeniero de Ventas, José Jarque, a Japón. Después de una corta visita, en la que obtuvo la ayuda de la oficina de la multinacional en Tokio, Jarque informó que la obtención de las aprobaciones necesarias en cuanto a homologación de los productos no parecía muy difícil. Había conseguido las especificaciones japonesas en inglés, e incluso había contactado con un posible distribuidor (SUN).
I+D estudió las especificaciones y se realizaron pruebas y modelos, que pasaron los test necesarios sin dificultad. Se realizaron pruebas en STL, que también resultaron positive. Marketing meanwhile was in contact with the distributor, having reached an agreement in principle, in terms of quantity, price, warranties, etc.. Jarque
returned to Tokyo to specify some points, for example, certain features of the model could be adapted to the tastes of the client, to meet the standards in any case, and also to obtain commitments to purchase by the dealer. He came back with two things: the characteristics desired by the dealer as most suitable for the Japanese market and an order for the first six months. It also set the selling price to the dealer.
samples and information were prepared for approval and sent to Japan, where the office of the multinational, with the cooperation of the dealer made the necessary administrative steps. The approval was obtained in record time, being the first foreign company CITES entered into the Japanese market handsets.
In due time, and as the program made the first shipments. All was well for a year. Meanwhile competitors got approval and began to enter the market. Due to technological improvements and cost experience curve of the product, which is also sold in other markets (Australia, Sweden, USA) suffered a significant drop. Al
discuss the volumes and prices for the following year, during a visit by the distributor to the CITES office, asked for some changes of characteristics in the model. Especially noted that the adjustment ring should be changed. Was not sure of the changes required Jarque requested a visit to Japan to talk with their coaches. During the visit changes were implemented. Were made in R & D and production joined with ease, as consisting in a different way of adjustment, without changes in parts and components.
began shipments and a few weeks later received a telex from the dealer saying that the product did not agree with the contract, as the bell did not work according to specification. He also said that did not explain the error as it was easily fixed by a fit, that their technicians had performed in Japan.
reset request product samples and, on arrival it was found that all was due to a misunderstanding, caused, almost certainly, for use by both partners in a language (English) than their own. In other words to specify the Japanese had wanted to say something other than what they had understood Jarque, as each gave the English word used (buzzer) a different meaning.
The problem was that Japan had a large number (40,000) of products with maladjustment. Sent back to Spain meant a tremendous cost both in money and time. So the dealer suggested that adjustments in Japan, charging the costs to CITES. Did not discuss who was responsible, since estimated the cost of repair by the CITES Industrial Engineering, proved less than $ 1 per unit, with all the necessary operations (unpacked, open, reset, close , testing, packaging). It was considered more important to maintain the image against the dealer.
The surprise came when, several months after the bill was received by, worth about $ 400,000. Immediately telex was answered by asking for clarification and information as they had reached that figure. As the information was discovered that the setting operation had estimated the time Japanese technical about ten times higher than the English.
At that time there were more problems. Sales had declined due to competitive pressure, and CITES wanted to keep their sales in Japan at all costs. The costs were down, so that the Director General was in favor of reducing the price, keeping the margin. Specifically, he proposed a reduction of $ 2 per unit (cost had decreased $ 2). Budgeted unit sales for following year were 40,000 units, with a price of $ 35.
The Director General Jarque and I decided that we were in Tokyo to solve both problems. We went in May 1984. SUN
we meet with the calculations we present our Industrial Engineering and ask them to teach us theirs. They said that their engineering was in Osaka, and needed time to consult and cite us for the next day at nine o'clock. That same evening we called the hotel asking to postpone the meeting for another day. When we finally met, they began to apologize and make sure everything was due to an error in typing a secretary calculations of engineering. As they had run the decimal point one place to the right, multiplying by ten the time required for adjustment. No exaggeration to say they spent about two hours apologizing. (We did not commit hara-kiri of miracle). With the new data for their calculation and ours were practically identical. In summary we had to pay was about $ 40,000.
Then I told a story "Chinese (or Japanese). I told them out of Spain needed foreign exchange was very complicated (some truth there), so I proposed that payment be made through a $ 1 discount on each unit of these 40,000, maintaining the existing price. So not only kept the price but also ensured the sale of 40,000 units. As I took in low spirits, accepted the first. That night we were invited to the club, as is common in Japan, and we got to the cap of whiskey. All's well that ends well.
I can not resist telling a story of our relationship with Sun, which illustrates the Japanese society. One day I called the Sales Department Cites Madrid to say that the Director of Marketing at Sun wanted to meet us, but that came very badly to come to Malaga, cheap problems, so he asked me to be me to Madrid. Of course I said yes. But a few days I became call, saying Yamanishi (Director of Marketing for SUN) had telephoned canceling the trip. The Yamanishi said, about 38, was the son of the owner of Sun, but that does not have privileges. Reporting to Director of SUN in Tokyo (a very individual character of the former Japanese representative: authoritarian, chauvinistic and macho). SUN had the plant in Osaka and Tokyo office. Since we had to talk to SUN and Yamanishi not come we decided to go to Tokyo. Once there, while having a drink in his club Yamanishi said, "I wonder to cancel my trip to Spain." "Yes" I replied. And I told him. He planned to go on a trip to Europe on Friday. On Thursday, a week before the trip, he called his father from Osaka and quoted him in his office the next day. Upon arrival went to the office of his father, who opened a drawer of his desk, took a picture, and gave it as he said: "Next Friday you marry this lady." Yamanishi
At the end I said: "I guess you missed this, but it is the Japanese custom, the parents decide who you marry."
I think things are camber, but Japan is another world.
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